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Our results are generally not supportive of the commonly accepted buyback theories. For example, although the large majority of our sample firms follow through with their announced intention to repurchase shares (consistent with a positive signal), they also issue shares (consistent with a negative signal). In fact, our average sample firm increases its shares outstanding 23.73 percent following their buyback announcement, and our typical sample firm has an insignificant change of -0.88 percent. At most, we find that buybacks slow the growth in shares outstanding 1 We examine our sample firms for the long-term following their buyback announcements because of the evidence reported in previous studies that the market underreacts to buyback announcements (e.g., Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) ), and to be consistent with many other studies discussed below that examine long-term operating performance, capital structure, and other firm characteristics. compared to similar firms that do not announce buybacks (we refer to this as a matched-firm adjusted measure of the change in shares outstanding).
Stock issuances also offset the effect of buybacks on a firm's capital structure (e.g., a buyback increases a firm's leverage ratio, ceteris paribus, whereas a stock issuance lowers a firm's leverage ratio) and, in contrast to the capital structure theory of buybacks, we do not find consistent evidence that buybacks increase our sample firms' matched-firm adjusted leverage ratios or default risk. These results suggest that bondholders should not be harmed by buybacks, and we find no evidence of such harm during the buyback announcement period or during the long-term period following the announcement.
Stock issuances following buybacks also replenish cash that is dispersed by buybacks. In fact, we find no consistent evidence that our sample firms' cash flow from financing activities declines following buybacks or that their assets or sales decline relative to their matched firms.
These results do not support the agency/free cash flow theory's prediction that stock buybacks reduce agency costs by constraining managers from destroying shareholder wealth through "empire building" and other forms of wasteful investments.
At first glance, our results appear to be consistent with the option-funding hypothesis (Kahle (2002) ), which posits that managers repurchase shares to "fund" the exercise of employee stock options. Kahle (2002) argues that this hypothesis explains why firms may have an increase in shares outstanding following a buyback announcement. The exercise of employee stock options does not become significant until the 1990s, however, and yet we find that our sample firms' matched-firm adjusted change in shares outstanding is significantly lower in the 1990s compared to the 1980s.
With no consistent evidence of a change in shares outstanding, capital structure, or financing cash flows, we argue that there is no reason to expect to observe the kind of benefits from buybacks that the theories discussed above suggest, and we find no evidence of an improvement in our sample firms' operating performance following their buyback announcements. This result is inconsistent with the signaling theory. As Grullon and Michaely (2004, p. 652) state: "The signaling hypothesis predicts that future earnings (and other measures of profitability) should improve after share repurchase announcements."
Previous studies (e.g., Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) ) argue that the market appears to underreact to the benefit produced by buybacks, but our sample firms' operating performance suggests that there is no traditional benefit to which the market can underreact. Indeed, we find generally insignificant long-term abnormal stock returns for our sample firms following their buyback announcements.
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Though we do not find consistent evidence of the beneficial changes presumed in commonly accepted buyback theories, we do find consistent evidence of positive abnormal stock returns around buyback announcements. So why does the stock market view buyback announcements as good news?
We posit that the buying and selling of their own shares that firms do following their buyback announcements represents trading that enhances liquidity (i.e., the liquidity hypothesis).
For example, the firm's trading activity provides greater depth for investors who wish to buy or sell the firm's shares, and consequently there is less of a price pressure effect resulting from the investors' trades. In short, the liquidity hypothesis posits that buyback announcements do not imply a change in the firm's intrinsic value (i.e., its value without accounting for transaction costs); instead, buybacks portend a decrease in the transaction costs of trading in the firm's shares. The stock market's positive response to buyback announcements is consequently a reflection of the value of these lower transaction costs.
Our empirical tests are supportive of the liquidity hypothesis. We find a significant increase in trading depth and a significant decrease in transaction costs after our sample firms' 2 Of course, there is no reason to expect long-term abnormal returns if the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) holds (as Mitchell and Stafford (2000) argue). Our argument, however, goes beyond any appeal to the EMH as the reason to not expect the market to underreact to buybacks buyback announcements. We also conduct a series of regressions of the announcement period abnormal stock returns on our liquidity measures and on other measures posited by various buyback theories. We find that our liquidity measures are consistently significant factors in explaining the abnormal stock returns. None of the other variables posited by the various buyback theories that we discuss above are as consistently significant.
Our findings are consistent with recent work by Cook, Krigman and Leach (2004) . They examine a sample of 64 firms announcing an open market repurchase program between March 10, 1993 and March 4, 1994 . They analyze the actual buyback transactions of these firms following their buyback announcements and find that these transactions generally increase liquidity. Their paper is an important extension of conflicting findings in previous studies that examine the liquidity effect of buyback announcements (e.g., Barclay and Smith (1988), Miller and McConnell (1995) , Brockman and Chung (2001) ). Our paper differs from their paper (and others) in four notable respects. First, we examine stock issuances following buyback
announcements. Second, we analyze the relation between liquidity changes and abnormal stock (and bond) returns around buyback announcements. Third, we compare the relative importance of the liquidity hypothesis to other theories offering an explanation for the positive stock price reaction to buyback announcements. Finally, we provide evidence that the stock market does not appear to underreact to buyback announcements.
In short, our paper makes three primary contributions to the literature. First, we find that the stock selling activity of firms following buyback announcements generally works against the predictions of the signaling theory (e.g., operating performance does not improve), the capital structure theory (e.g., no consistent evidence that our sample firms' capital structure or default risk changes much relative to their matched firms), and the agency theory (e.g., no consistent evidence that our sample firms' agency cost measures change much relative to their matched firms). Second, we provide evidence that the market does not underreact to buyback because we find no traditional benefit from buybacks to which the market can underreact.
announcements. Third, we provide evidence that greater liquidity appears to be the dominant explanation for the positive stock price reaction to buyback announcements.
In the next section, we discuss the sample selection procedures and present some descriptive statistics. In Section II, we present the changes in the buyback theory variables.
Section III discusses our methods and empirical results for our sample firms' long-term performance following buyback announcements. We present the announcement period abnormal return tests in Section IV and summarize the paper in Section V.
I. Data

A. Sample Construction
Our initial sample consists of 9,191 buybacks announced between January 1, 1981 and To be included in at least some of our tests, we require that these firms have shares outstanding data reported in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) files as of the buyback announcement month. There are 7,079 firms that satisfy this criterion; 5,272 are open market repurchases and 1,807 are tender offers. Our sample size then varies depending on the data required for our various tests.
For our operating performance tests, the sample firm must have the necessary data available in Compustat. For example, to compute the change in a firm's times interest earned ratio (TIECH; where the TIE ratio is calculated as EBIT/INT) ratio, the firm must have interest expense (INT; Compustat data item #15) and earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT;
Compustat data item #178) available as of the year before its buyback announcement and at least one year after its buyback announcement. We use the Lehman corporate bond database to conduct our tests of the bondholder wealth effects from buybacks, and there are 1,469 cases where the firm announces a buyback and has bond price data available in this database as of the announcement month.
B. Descriptive Statistics
We show the descriptive statistics for our sample in Table 1. For this table, we measure the level variables as of the year before the buyback announcement (event year -1), and the change variables from the beginning of the year before the buyback announcement (year -2) to the end of the year (year -1).
3 As expected, the average equity market capitalization ($1,566.9 million) is substantially larger than the median ($218.72 million). Our average sample firm announces its intention to repurchase nearly 10 percent of its shares outstanding (i.e., 9.88 percent) whereas our typical sample firm targets 5.72 percent of its shares. The average marketto-book (MB; i.e., the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity) ratio of 2.05
and median ratio of 1.51 suggest that our sample firms have growth opportunities (even the 25 th percentile MB is greater than unity).
When we compare our sample firm's MB to that of otherwise similar firms that do not announce buybacks (again, the matched firms; we discuss our matching procedure in more detail below), we do find that our sample firm's MB is slightly lower than the MB of their matched firms, but the negative average and median abnormal MB (i.e., ABMB; the difference between our sample firms' MB and the MB of their matched firms) does not reverse the fact that our sample firms have growth opportunities; it only suggests that our sample firms' growth opportunities are not quite as great as that of their matched firms. In short, the fact that most of our sample firms have MBs greater than unity is not consistent with the agency theory presumption that buybacks are used by firms with few, if any, profitable investment opportunities who are looking to dispense free cash flows.
We use three measures of capital structure and default risk changes. Our first measure is the change in the debt-equity ratio (DECH), where the debt-equity (DE) ratio is defined as the book value of total debt (data item #9 + data item #34) divided by the market value of equity. average and median ABTIE are significantly positive, but the median ABTIE is only 0.20. We also find that our average and median ABBR is significantly lower and this means that our sample firms have a relatively better bond rating (i.e., a higher bond rating number with the Compustat data item #280 implies a lower bond rating). The median ABBR of -1, for example, suggests that our typical sample firm has a bond rating of, say, A compared to a rating of A-for its matched firm. This difference might suggest that our sample firms are underlevered but it also might suggest that our sample firms are better managed than their matched firms (as the positive ABTIE suggests). Overall, these statistics are not consistent with the argument that our sample firms have suboptimal capital structures before their buyback announcements.
For the agency theory of buybacks, we examine four different variables in Across the twelve Fama and French industry codes, we find that firms in the Money and Finance industry (i.e., Industry 11) have the largest representation (1,776) for our entire sample period but not for every year of our sample. Moreover, we have an economically significant number of sample firms in each industry with no industry unrepresented in any of our sample years. So our sample does not appear to be overweighted with firms from any one industry or small group of industries. Nevertheless, to be complete, we still control for industry effects in the matching procedure that we use to compute abnormal operating performance and abnormal stock returns.
analysis of the post-buyback operating performance (changes in shares outstanding).
II. Changes in Buyback Theory Variables
A. Percentage Change in Shares Outstanding
We After we have computed the share change variables for each firm, we compute the crosssectional average and median of each of the yearly changes. We report the average and median changes for our share change variables but focus on medians for the other (accounting) variables in recognition of the significant skewness problems that exists with cross-sectional accounting data (e.g., Loughran and Ritter (1997) ). To check for time trends, as suggested earlier, we also split our sample into firms that announce buybacks during the 1980s and compare them to firms that announce buybacks during the 1990s.
Because we are measuring changes in shares outstanding, and other operating measures over a full five-year period following buyback announcements, we also compare our sample firms' changes to that of their matched firms. As we note above, these firms have relatively similar attributes to our sample firms except that the matched firms do not announce a buyback during the year in which the sample firm (to which it is matched) announces its buyback.
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Comparing our sample firm's changes to that of their matched firm provides insights on the extent to which the sample firm's changes are due to the buyback or are just part of changes made by similar firms that do not announce buybacks.
Our initial screen for the matched firms is that they must be in the same 2-digit SIC code as the sample firm. The matched firms are then defined as the ones with jointly the lowest absolute percentage difference with the sample firm in the market value of equity, and the bookto-market ratio as of the year before the buyback announcement (again, year -1). The abnormal measures are defined as the sample firm's raw measure minus the average of its five most closely matched firms' (raw) measures (see Lee (1997) for an illustration of this method as applied to the measurement of abnormal stock returns).
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To address potential survivorship bias concerns with this abnormal measure, we freeze the measure if the sample firm no longer has data available before the end of the 60-month period (as we discuss above for the raw measures)), or if the primary matched firm (i.e., the firm most closely matched to the sample firm out of the group of five matched firms) no longer has data 5 As a robustness test, we choose another set of matched firms that do not announce a buyback within a five year period following the year in which the sample firm (to which it is matched) announces its buyback (all of the other matching criteria that we use are the same). Because buybacks are so common, the relatively similarity of the characteristics of our sample firms and their matched firms is lessened with this greater restriction. Nevertheless, the results that we present in Tables 3 through 10 are qualitatively similar with this alternative sample of matched firms.
available. With this procedure, a sample firm can "drop out" of the sample (i.e., have its variables "frozen") due to its own "delisting" from CRSP or Compustat (depending on the variable being examined), or the "delisting" of its primary matched firm. To the extent that the sample firm's "delisting" creates survivorship bias, this concern is offset by the loss of sample firms that are dropped because their primary matched firm is "delisted."
We show the average and median percentage changes in shares outstanding for our sample firms over the five-year period following their buyback announcements in panel A of Table 3 . By the end of the first year, our average firm has repurchased much of the shares that they target in the announcement, with an average SHDEC of -5.16 percent. 7 The median SHDEC (-2.33 percent) is less than half the size of the average, but it is still economically and statistically significant. So, again, firms are buying back shares following their buyback announcements. On the other hand, the average and median SHINC (3.67 and 0.26 percent) are also significant (i.e., firm are also issuing shares), and consequently the average and median SHCH (-1.47 and -1.30) are notably smaller in size than the average and median SHDEC. In fact, by the end of the second year, the average SHCH is significantly positive (1.22 percent).
Over the full five-year period, the average SHCH is a significant 23.73 percent and the median SHCH is an insignificant -0.88 percent. When we compare our sample firms' SHCH to that of their matched firms (we refer to this measure as the abnormal SHCH or ABSHCH), we find a consistently significant negative difference. These results show that buybacks do not 6 We also estimate the results using a single-firm matching procedure and they are qualitatively similar to the results that we present. 7 These results are consistent with Stephens and Weisbach (1998); they report that firms end up repurchasing 74 to 82 percent of the shares that they announce their intention to buy back in the open market, and nearly 60 percent of firms repurchase at least all of the shares that they target in their announcement. So the large majority of buyback announcements represent highly credible commitments to repurchase shares. Moreover, repurchases are commonplace, large, and growing. As Grullon and Michaely (2002) decrease our typical sample firm's number of shares outstanding; at most, they slow their relative growth (and, as we show below, lower abnormal growth in shares outstanding is actually associated with generally worse performance).
In Panel B of Table 3 , we report the average and median share change variables for the 1980s minus the average and median share change variables for the 1990s. The median SHCH is significantly lower for the 1980s than for the 1990s in every event year. Though the average difference in the SHCH is insignificant in years four and five, the bulk of the statistics show that buybacks announced during the 1990s have a higher SHCH than buybacks announced during the 1980s (though the differences in the medians are generally small). When we compare our sample firms to their matched firms, however, the trend is reversed. The average and median difference in the ABSHCH is significant and positive from year two through year five. So even though our sample firms have greater growth in shares outstanding during the 1990s, their matched firms have even higher growth. These results are inconsistent with the option-funding hypothesis because they show that the higher SHCH for firms announcing buybacks during the 1990s (when employee stock options become significant) appears to be unrelated to buyback announcements.
We report the average and median share change variables for open market repurchases minus the average and median for tender offers in Panel C. As expected, open market repurchases have a significantly higher average and median SHDEC for each year (i.e., our open market repurchase firms buy back significantly fewer shares than our tender offer firms). The differences in the average and median SHINC, however, are much smaller (in magnitude or statistical significance) and the average SHINC is significantly lower for open market repurchases in years one and two. Most important, the average difference in the SHCH and ABSHCH are insignificant in all but one case, and the median difference in the ABSHCH is insignificant for years three through five. Therefore, while we do find that firms conducting tender offers buy back a greater portion of their shares than firms conducting open market repurchases, we also find that their matched firms are behaving similarly such that the ABSHCH is generally indistinguishable between the two groups of firms.
To be succinct, we only present the remaining results (except for Table 10) 
B. Capital Structure and Agency Theory Variable Changes
We report the various capital structure and default risk changes in Table 4 . During the buyback year (i.e., year 0) and the subsequent five years, there is a significant increase in our typical sample firm's debt-equity ratio relative to the year before their buyback announcements (i.e., year -1). At first glance, these results are consistent with what we should expect following a buyback announcement according to the capital structure theory, but these debt ratio changes are not unique to our sample firms. When we compare our sample firms' changes to their matched firms' changes, their abnormal debt-equity (i.e., ABDECH) change is positive for years zero through three, but negative for year four and insignificant for year five.
The other capital structure and default risk measures are even less supportive of the capital structure theory of buybacks. There is a significant increase in our typical sample firm's TIE ratio in year zero. Though there is a significant decrease in their TIE ratios for years one through five, there is an insignificant change in their ABTIE ratios for the same years. Finally, there is no evidence of an increase in our sample firm's default risk as shown by the lack of any change in our typical sample firm's bond rating (BR) for any of the years zero through five or for their abnormal bond rating (ABBR) for years one through five; in fact, ABBR actually shows a significant decrease in default risk for year zero. Our four measures of changes in agency costs following buybacks consistently show in Table 4 that our sample firms' raw changes are supportive of the agency/free cash flow theory.
That is, we find consistent evidence that our sample firms decrease their cash flow from equity financing and from debt and equity financing. Our sample firms also decrease their assets and sales in year zero and in all subsequent years. None of these changes, however, appear to be unique to our sample firms' buyback announcements because we find that their matched firms are making similar changes as evidenced by the insignificant ABECASH, ABDECASH, ABASSETCH and ABSALESCH in many years (in fact, many of these variables are significantly positive). The agency cost changes that we observe for our sample firms appear to be part of general long-term trends among similar firms that do not announce buybacks and therefore do not appear to be attributable to our sample firm's buyback announcement decisions.
III. Long-Term Abnormal Operating and Security Return Performance
A.
Long-Term Abnormal Operating Performance
We examine four measures of changes in operating performance (i.e., what we call abnormal operating performance) using the same methods that we use to compute the changes in the buyback theory variables discussed above such as SALESCH. In particular, we examine the change in EBIT divided by SALES (EBITCH); the abnormal change in EBIT divided by SALES (ABEBITCH); the change in EBITDA divided by SALES (EBITDACH); and the abnormal change in EBITDA divided by SALES (ABEBITDACH).
In Table 5 we show our four measures of operating performance for year zero and the subsequent five years. Not only is there virtually no evidence of improvement in operating performance but most of the results suggest a decline in operating performance. These results are not supportive of the signaling theory of buybacks.
In Table 6 , we examine the operating performance differences between firms that ex post fulfill the predictions of the various buyback theories and those that do not. To be succinct, we examine EBITCH and ABEBITCH for years zero through five; we find qualitatively similar results when we examine EBITDACH and ABEBITDACH. In every case, we find that firms that 8 When the median change is exactly zero, we do not report a significance level.
just happen to do what a particular buyback theory predicts do no better than firms that do not fulfill the theory's prediction (in fact, they often perform worse). For example, in contrast to the suggestions of the agency theory, firms with a positive ABSHCH over the five-year period following their buyback announcements have significantly greater operating performance changes in every case except for year zero with EBITCH.
Lie (2004) finds that abnormal operating performance improves following buyback announcements when firms actually repurchase shares. Firms that do not repurchase shares do not experience an improvement in operating performance. In other words, for a buyback announcement to signal an improvement in operating performance, it has to be bonded with actual repurchases. Our results show that when share issuances are accounted for, the firm's operating performance does not appear to be better (worse) when firms decrease (increase) shares outstanding.
B. Long-Term Abnormal Security Return Tests
To examine whether there are significant long-term abnormal security returns following buyback announcements, we follow two primary recommendations of Fama (1998). First, we use calendar-time returns because Fama (1998) argues that this return metric avoids the bias in the event-time return metric (especially when buy and hold abnormal returns are used) toward rejecting the EMH. 9 Second, we use value-weighted (VW) returns in recognition of Fama's (1998) argument that equal-weighted (EW) returns are biased toward rejecting the EMH.
Nevertheless, we also report equal-weighted returns in recognition of Loughran and Ritter's 9 An event-time return is a return computed as of an event month following a firm's buyback announcement (where event month (i.e., event period) 0 is the buyback announcement month; so the calendar period is irrelevant except that the buyback announcement must occur between 1981 and 1995). Calendar-time returns (also called the calendar-time return metric) are portfolio returns computed as of a particular calendar period (e.g., the average return in January 1988 for our sample firms' stocks following their buyback announcements; so a firm's event period is irrelevant as long as the calendar period is within the 60 month period following the firm's buyback announcement).
(2000) argument that equal weighting is better because it does not obscure the mispricing that is more likely to occur with smaller firms (as the value-weighting does).
We also address Fama's (1998) concern over the appropriate measure of expected returns (i.e., the bad-model problem) by using zero-investment portfolio returns. These portfolios consist of long positions in the sample firm stocks and short positions in their matched firm stocks (e.g., matched based on characteristics discussed above). These portfolios appeal to the matched firm method of controlling for risk that previous studies use (e.g., Loughran and Ritter (1995) ). Then these zero investment portfolio returns are adjusted for risk again using a factor model (e.g., the
Fama and French three-factor model, or the Carhart four-factor model). Any remaining residual return is deemed to be "abnormal."
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The Fama and French (FF) three-factor model for long-term abnormal stock returns is shown in equation (1):
where R pt is the average raw return for stocks in calendar month t (where a sample stock is included if month t is within the 60-month period following its buyback announcement), R ft is the one-month T-bill return, R mt is the CRSP value-weighted market index return, SMB t is the return on a portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a portfolio of large stocks, HML t is the return on a portfolio of stocks with high book-to-market ratios minus the return on a portfolio of stocks with low book-to-market ratios.
We also estimate the abnormal stock returns with a momentum factor (i.e., UMD; return on high momentum stocks minus the return on low momentum stocks) included as an additional risk factor. 11 Because Carhart (1997) shows the importance of momentum in expected return measures, we refer to the following model as the Carhart four-factor model: 
where R Bondpt is the average raw bond return for month t (i.e., the cross-sectional average of each firm's "one" bond return; where a sample firm is included if month t is within the 60-month period following its buyback announcement), UnxGDP is the unexpected change in gross domestic product, UnxCPI is the unexpected change in the consumer price index, DRP is the default risk premium, R BondMkt is the return on the Lehman corporate bond index, and Term is the 11 We thank Kenneth French for providing data for the HML, SMB, and UMD factors on his web site (i.e., http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french). We also thank him for providing data on the 12 Fama and French industry classifications. 12 Eberhart and Siddique (2002) also use this model in their study of long-term abnormal returns following seasoned equity offerings slope of the term structure. We follow the estimation procedures discussed in EGB for the estimation of each factor. 13 The intercept (α) in equations (1) through (4) is the abnormal return measure. We correct the standard errors in equations (1) through (4) for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using the quadratic spectral kernel as recommended by Andrews (1991).
C. Long-Term Abnormal Security Return Test Results
We present our long-term abnormal stock and bond returns in Table 7 . For the overall sample in Panel A, we report that alpha is significant and positive (0.58 percent) with the FF model using equal-weighted returns, and with the Carhart model using equal and value-weighted returns. On the other hand, the equal-weighted EMN alpha is significant and negative and the value-weighted FF and EMN alphas are insignificant. Moreover, none of the alphas for the zeroinvestment portfolios in Panel B are significant.
In short, any examination of long-term abnormal returns raises concerns about the bad model problem and the appropriateness of value weighting and equal weighting. Our evidence suggests that the existence of long-term abnormal stock returns following buyback announcements appears to be sensitive to the model used to estimate expected returns, and to the use of value-weighted returns. When we use zero-investment portfolio returns, we find no evidence of long-term abnormal stock returns. Because the existence of the long-term abnormal stock returns does not appear to be robust to these various methods of computing abnormal returns, we think that the results suggest that the stock market does not underreact to buyback announcements. To the extent that there is any underreaction, then the results that we present below suggest that it is an underreaction to the liquidity benefit of buybacks.
The abnormal bond returns we report following the buyback announcements are consistent with our earlier evidence showing that buybacks do not increase our sample firm's 13 Because many firms have multiple bonds, treating the abnormal returns to individual bonds as independent sample points biases the standard errors downward because of the high correlation among bonds from the same firm. To avoid this bias, our bond return tests are based on a sample default risk. In fact, though our value-weighted bond alpha is insignificant, our equal-weighted EGB bond alpha is a significant 0.16 percent.
We make some additional comparisons of the alphas between various subsamples in Table 8 . 14 These subsample comparisons are the same comparisons we make with our operating performance measures in Table 6 . Our results in Table 8 are notably similar to our Table 6 results in showing that firms that just happen to fulfill a buyback theory prediction do no better and often do worse. Because our focus is on abnormal stock return performance, the differences we find suggest that the market is often pleasantly surprised when our sample firms do not fulfill the prediction of a commonly accepted buyback theory. For example, in contrast to the agency theory, firms that have a positive ASSETCH over the five-year period following their buyback announcement have significantly higher alphas in every case except with the value-weighted returns using the Carhart model.
Finally, recent work by Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee (2003) shows that firms that repurchase shares outstanding during the first year following their buyback announcements have lower abnormal stock returns over the same period than firms that do not repurchase shares. Intuitively, firms that repurchase fewer shares do so because the market has adjusted so quickly to the signal sent by the buyback announcement (i.e., that the firm's stock is undervalued) that the firm cannot take advantage of its undervalued stock price.
When we split our sample into firms that have a positive change in shares outstanding (so, again, we consider share repurchases and share issuances) and firms that have a negative change over the first year following their buyback announcements (we measure raw and abnormal changes), we find no consistent evidence that firms with a negative change in shares outstanding have lower abnormal stock returns over that same period (we compute abnormal of "one" bond per firm using a value-weighted average of each of the firm's bond returns each month.
stock returns using the same methods as in Table 7 ; to save space, we do not report the results but they are available from the authors).
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IV. Announcement Period Abnormal Returns
The results we present above show that our sample firms do not experience the kind of changes presumed in commonly accepted buyback theories. Consequently, we argue that it is not surprising that we do not find evidence of improvement in their operating performance or any long-term abnormal stock returns. All previous studies, however, report positive abnormal stock returns around buyback announcements and we also compute these abnormal returns.
To be consistent with our long-term abnormal return measures, we compute our announcement period abnormal returns using the same calendar time methods and report the results in Table 9 . We find significant positive abnormal stock returns in all but one case in Panel A (the value-weighted abnormal return of 1.14 percent using the EMN model is marginally insignificant). When we compute the zero-investment portfolio abnormal returns, the results are significant in every case ranging from 1.38 percent to 2.79 percent. The market clearly views buyback announcements as good news for shareholders.
On the other hand, buyback announcements appear to be non-events to bondholders as evidenced by the insignificant abnormal bond returns that we report in Panel A. This finding is consistent with our earlier evidence of generally no significant rise in our sample firms' default risk.
14 To save space, we do not present the stock alphas using the EMN model or the bond alphas using the EGB model. The stock alpha comparisons using the EMN model are similar to the results that we present. The bond alpha comparisons show no significant differences. 15 We also find no consistent evidence that firms with a negative change in shares outstanding over the first year following their buyback announcements have higher abnormal stock returns over the second through fifth year following their buyback announcements (Chan, Ikenberry and Lee (2003) report that firms that repurchase shares outstanding during the first year following their buyback announcements have higher subsequent abnormal stock returns during the second through fourth year following their buyback announcements than firms that do not repurchase shares during the first year following their buyback announcements).
In Panels C and D of Table 9 , we examine the changes in our sample firms' trading depth and transaction costs. For each of these firms, we compute the announcing firm's average bid depth, offer/ask depth, combined bid-offer depth, bid-ask spread, and relative bid-ask spread (the bid-ask spread divided by the price) for a 90-day period preceding the firm's buyback announcement (i.e., from 120 days to 31 days before the announcement). We then compute each variable's value for 31 days to 120 days after the announcement, and compare it to the preannouncement average value. We also compute the change in each of these variable's abnormal (i.e., matched-firm adjusted) values. This abnormal measure is computed similarly to the other abnormal measures. For example, we compute the average difference between our sample firm's relative bid-ask spread and its matched firm's relative bid-ask spread for the 90-day period preceding the sample firm's buyback announcement. We then compute the average difference for the 90-day period following the sample firm's buyback announcement and the change in these average differences is the abnormal relative spread change (ABRSCH) for that firm.
We gather data on the bid-ask spread, bid depth, and ask depth from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) files (we also gather bid-ask spread data from the CRSP files). Because the TAQ data are only available for a portion of our sample firms, we compare the descriptive statistics for this sample to the descriptive statistics for our full sample in Table 1 and find an insignificant difference with most of the variables (the results are available from the authors). So this subsample does not appear to be unrepresentative of the full sample.
We present the changes in the trading depth in Panel C. There is a significant increase in the bid-depth, ask-depth, and combined bid-ask depth following buyback announcements.
Consistent with our finding that firms are repurchasing and issuing shares following buyback announcements, we find similar increases in the bid and ask depth. We also find significant increases in matched-firm adjusted trading depth.
In Panel D, we show the resulting decrease in transaction costs following buyback announcements. Using the full sample of firms with bid-ask spread data available in CRSP, we find a significant decrease of 0.09 percent in the relative bid-ask spread (RSCH). For the subsample of our firms with TAQ data, we find a significant decrease of 0.11 percent in the RSCH. The change in the abnormal relative bid-ask spread (ABRSCH) is even greater in magnitude than the RSCH, with a decrease of 0.17 percent for both the CRSP and TAQ samples.
As a final test of the liquidity hypothesis, we perform regressions of the announcement period abnormal stock returns on our liquidity change measures, changes in shares outstanding, agency cost changes, and capital structure changes. Moreover, we include a measure of stock options relative to common shares outstanding because Kahle (2002) suggests that this is an important factor in explaining announcement period abnormal stock returns. Because our sample consists of thousands of firms going back to 1981, we do not have footnote data from their annual reports (as Kahle (2002) does for her sample of 712 repurchases from 1991 to 1996). Instead, we use a proxy measure from Compustat that we refer to as CSOPTION (i.e., Compustat's common shares reserved for conversion of stock options; data item #215) measured as of the year before the buyback announcement. We also measure the difference between our sample firms' CSOPTION and their matched firms' CSOPTION that we refer to as ABCSOPTION. We also include the percentage of shares targeted in the firm's buyback announcement (PSOUGHT) because this variable is noted in many previous studies as an important factor in the announcement period abnormal stock returns (e.g., Comment and Jarrell (1991) ).
Because of Grullon and Michaely's (2004) findings on changes in the cost of capital
following buyback announcements, we include a cost of capital change (CCCH) variable. 16 We measure the cost of capital using the Carhart four-factor model estimated over the 60-month period preceding the buyback announcement, and then over the 60-month period following the 16 We find some evidence that our sample firms' cost of capital decreases following their buyback announcements but the results are not robust to alternative measures of the cost of capital (of course greater liquidity is beneficial even if does not lead to a decrease in systematic risk). In contrast, the multivariate regression results we present in We estimate these regression models using eight different specifications as shown in Table 10 . By far, the most consistently significant variable is the liquidity change (i.e., RSCH and ABRSCH). The coefficient estimates for these variables are negative in every case, and are only insignificant with the ABRSCH measure using the TAQ data in the last column. Among the other variables, the cost of capital change is generally significant and negative, consistent with Grullon and Michaely (2004) . All of the other variables are generally insignificant.
In short, we consider a wide range of alternative explanations for the positive stock price reaction to buyback announcements, and our results suggest that liquidity change is the dominant factor in the market's reaction. The market's reaction to buyback announcements, however, does not have to coincide with the reasons that executives cite for undertaking buybacks. In a recent survey, Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2004) interview 384 financial executives to determine the factors that affect buyback decisions. Liquidity is cited as an important factor but other factors (e.g., the stock is a "good buy") are cited as more important. 17 At first glance, this finding may appear to be inconsistent with our finding on the relative importance of liquidity but, again, our paper is not testing why managers choose to repurchase their stock. Our paper is testing why the market views repurchase announcements as good news and this can be a very different test. For example, Brav et al. (p. 17; 2004) note that "A notable portion of executives express the view that repurchasing shares reduces the total number of shares and, therefore, automatically increases EPS." Of course, the market should see that this type of "cosmetic" change in reported earnings per share is irrelevant to a stock's value (as Kahle (2002) notes). So, again, there can be important differences between the reasons managers cite for repurchasing shares, and the reason(s) the market views a buyback announcement as beneficial to shareholders.
V. Conclusions
Stock buyback announcements are commonplace events that are extensively examined in many previous studies. These studies propose various theories for why firms undertake buybacks and there are varying degrees of empirical support for each theory. We examine a sample of Instead, our results provide strong support for an alternative explanation for the positive stock price reaction to buyback announcements that we refer to as the liquidity hypothesis. Our support for this hypothesis follows from our examination of actual stock repurchases and issuances following buyback announcements. Though the majority of our sample firms follow through with their announced intention to repurchase shares, they also issue shares following buyback announcements. In fact, we find that our sample firms increase their shares outstanding 23.73 percent, on average, over the five-year period following their buyback announcements (the median change in shares outstanding is an insignificant -0.88 percent).
We argue that the buying and selling of their own shares that firms do following buyback announcements represents trading that enhances liquidity. For instance, the firm's trading 17 Liquidity is not referred to explicitly as the liquidity hypothesis that we posit in this paper. Nevertheless, the reference is closely connected is the sense that executives express concern activity provides greater depth for investors who wish to buy or sell the firm's shares so that there is less of a price pressure effect resulting from the investors' trades. This so-called liquidity hypothesis posits that buyback announcements do not imply a change in the firm's intrinsic value (i.e., its value without accounting for transaction costs); instead, buybacks portend a decrease in the transaction costs of trading in the firm's shares. The stock market's positive reaction to buyback announcements is consequently a reflection of the value of these lower transaction costs.
Consistent with the liquidity hypothesis, we find that our sample firms have a significant increase in trading depth and a significant decrease in transaction costs following their buyback announcements. Finally, after controlling for variables posited by the various buyback theories that we discuss above, we find that liquidity change is the dominant factor in explaining buyback announcement period abnormal stock returns.
regarding the price pressure effects of investors' trades on their firm's stock. This table presents some descriptive statistics for our sample of 7,079 buybacks announced between 1981 and 1995. PSOUGHT is the percentage of shares targeted in the firm's buyback announcement. The market-to-book ratio (MB) is measured as of the year before each sample firm's buyback announcement (i.e., event year -1). The abnormal MB (ABMB) is our sample firm's MB minus the MB of its matched firm, where a matched firm must be in the same 2-digit SIC code as the sample firm (all the abnormal variables have the AB prefix). The matched firm is then defined as the one with jointly the lowest absolute percentage difference with the sample firm in the market value of equity and the book-to-market ratio as of event year -1. The timesinterest-earned (TIE) is the ratio of the firm's earnings before interest and taxes to the interest expense as of event year -1. BR is the Standard and Poor's bond rating for the firm's overall creditworthiness as of event year -1. ECASHCH is the percentage change in the firm's cash flow from equity financing from the end of event year -2 to the end of event year -1. DECASHCH is the percentage change in the firm's cash flow from debt and equity financing from the end of event year -2 to the end of event year -1. ASSETCH is the percentage change in the firm's total assets from the end of event year -2 to the end of event year -1. SALESCH is the percentage change in the firm's sales from the end of event year -2 to the end of event year -1. The P-values are in parentheses.
This Panel A shows the average and median percentage change in shares outstanding (SHCH) over each of the five-year periods following our sample firm's buyback announcements for our overall sample. The percentage increase (SHINC) is defined as max(SHCH, 0), and the percentage decrease (SHDEC) is defined as min(SHCH, 0). SHDEC and SHINC are computed month-tomonth and are then compounded over the measurement period (e.g., one year). The difference between the sample firm's SHCH and the SHCH for its matched firm is referred to as the abnormal change in shares outstanding (ABSHCH). Panel B shows the share changes for the buybacks announced during the 1980s minus the share changes for buybacks announced during the 1990s. Panel C shows the share changes for open-market repurchases minus tender offer buybacks. The P-values are in parentheses (using the t-test for average tests and the Wilcoxon test for median tests). This table shows the typical change in various variables from the end of event year -1 to the end of event year 0 (i.e., the year in which the buyback announcement occurs) and to the end of each of the five full years following the buyback announcement. The variables are defined in Table 1 (the only difference is with variables such as DECH; in Table 1 , this is referred to as DE because it is being measured as of event year -1 whereas in this table it is referred to as DECH because we are measuring the change in the DE from event year -1 to year 0 and so on). More generally, all of the change variables in this table are measured relative to event year -1 (not event year -2 as in Table 1 ). Table 5 Changes This table shows the median changes in operating performance for our overall sample. EBITCH (ABEBITCH) is the change in the raw (abnormal) earnings before interest and taxes divided by sales. EBITDACH (ABEBITDACH) is the change in the raw (abnormal) earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by sales. All these changes in operating performance are measured relative to the year before the firm's buyback announcement (year -1).
The P-values are in parentheses (using the Wilcoxon test). Tables 1 and 4 for the variable definitions) is measured over the five-year period following the firm's buyback announcement. For example, SHCH is greater than zero when the percentage change in shares outstanding over the fiveyear period following the buyback announcement is greater than zero. P-values are shown in parentheses (using the Wilcoxon test). This table shows the average long-term abnormal returns (in calendar time) for the overall sample. The P-values are in parentheses (where the standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using the quadratic spectral kernel as recommended by Andrews (1991)). This table shows the differences in the average long-term (i.e., the five-year period following each firm's buyback announcement) abnormal stock returns between those observations where a variable is greater than zero minus those observations where a variable is less than or equal to zero. Each variable (see Tables 1 and 4 for the variable definitions) is measured over the fiveyear period following the firm's buyback announcement. For example, SHCH is greater than zero when the percentage change in shares outstanding over the five-year period following the buyback announcement is greater than zero. The P-values are in parentheses (using the asymptotic version of the Wald test that has a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions). Panel A shows the average abnormal stock and bond returns for our sample firms as of their buyback announcement month. Panel B shows the average abnormal stock returns using the zero-investment portfolios. In Panels C and D, we show the average changes in the bid-depth, ask-depth, bid-ask depth, bid-ask spread, and relative bid-ask spread (i.e., the bid-ask spread divided by the price); we then show the changes in the abnormal values of these variables. The variables are measured from the 90-day period preceding the sample firms' buyback announcements to the 90-day period following their buyback announcements. The abnormal value of each variable (e.g., the bid-depth) is the difference between the sample firm's bid-depth and the bid-depth for its matched firm. In Panel D, we also show the bid-ask spread changes using the bid-ask spread data from TAQ and from CRSP (the depth data in Panel C are from TAQ). The dependent variable in all of these regressions is the buyback announcement month abnormal stock return using the Carhart four-factor model of expected stock returns. The variable CCCH refers to the cost of capital change using the Carhart four-factor model. We measure this change using the Carhart four-factor model estimated over the 60-month preceding the buyback announcement and then over the 60-month period following the buyback announcement. We also compute and abnormal cost of capital change (ABCCCH) variable defined as the change in the cost of capital difference between our sample firms' and their matched firms. We include a measure of stock options relative to common shares outstanding because Kahle (2002) suggests that this is an important factor in explaining announcement period abnormal stock returns. We use a proxy measure from Compustat that we refer to as CSOPTION (i.e., Compustat's common shares reserved for conversion of stock options; data item #215) measured as of the year before the buyback announcement. We also measure the difference between our sample firms' CSOPTION and their matched firms' CSOPTION that we refer to as ABCSOPTION. We also include the percentage of shares targeted in the firm's buyback announcement (PSOUGHT) because this variable is noted in many previous studies as an important factor in the announcement period abnormal stock returns (e.g., Comment and Jarrell (1991) ). Finally, we include dummy variables for buybacks announced during the 1990s (this variable is not included for tests using the TAQ data because these data are not available during the 1980s) and for open market repurchases. The variable RSCH is the relative bid-ask spread change, and the variable ABRSCH is the abnormal relative bid-ask spread change. The other variables are defined in Tables 1 and 4 . These pooled cross-section regressions are computed using robust standard errors (i.e., the Huber and White standard errors). The P-values are in parentheses.
